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The ILO has reached a venerable old age. In 2009 it celebrated its ninetieth birthday, having 
been established in the wake of the First World War by the Treaty of Versailles that recognised 
the imperative to meet social needs and in response to a fear of bolshevism and the socialist 
movement spreading across Europe. 
 
Since 1919, the ILO has gone from its objective of standard setting to an agonised status in 
which it seems to be constantly lamenting the state of the world but without offering a coherent 
vision of what should be done or what role it could play in realising it. A global labour market is 
taking shape around it, and the ILO is pleading for relevance.  
 
Few people are listening. The huge sprawling bureaucracy, with its headquarters in Geneva and 
over 40 offices around the world, has drifted into the margins of international influence. This 
article, building on an earlier critique (Standing 2008), argues that this is due mainly to a refusal 
to offer a model of work suitable for the twenty-first century. This reflects not just weak 
politicised leadership but an antiquated ‘tripartite’ governance structure that is singularly 
unsuited to a world in which tertiary work is displacing industrial labour as the modal form of 
activity. The article traces the road that led to this impasse and proposes directions for change 
that could revive the ILO or guide a possible successor organisation. 
 
Building the labourist model 
 
The story of the ILO can be told in four acts, or periods – 1919-44, 1944-69, 1970-98 and 1999-
2009. The first two encompassed what Karl Polanyi (1944/1957) called the Great 
Transformation, the establishment of a regulated national market society based mainly on 
industrial labour. The latter two have encompassed the collapse of that society and the first phase 
of a Global Transformation – the painful forging of a global market society – that came to an 
abrupt halt with the financial crisis of 2008. Polanyi’s thesis was that a period of domination by 
financial markets leads to a crisis, followed by a search for new forms of regulation, 
redistribution and social protection. 
     
A. The legitimising era: 1919-44 
 
The ILO was set up on a ‘tripartite’ basis – involving trade unions and employer bodies as well 
as governments - to establish labour standards. These have taken the form of legally binding 
Conventions, negotiated by ILO members, on specific aspects of labour relations or social 
policy. Once approved, a Convention is open for ratification by member governments; 
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ratification commits the country to respect its terms, to submit regular reports demonstrating 
compliance to the ILO Committee of Experts, and to accept investigation of alleged breaches. 
Coupled with Conventions are less formal and non-binding Recommendations, which are usually 
more detailed guidelines on decent practices. 
 
Between 1919 and 1939, the ILO established 67 Conventions, oriented to protecting employees 
against exploitation and oppression. The very first committed ratifying governments to respect a 
48-hour working week. The second was a remarkably brief one on unemployment. All the 
Conventions and Recommendations in this period represented a movement to spread decent 
labour practices.  
 
Alongside the standard-setting activities, the ILO became a modest knowledge-gathering agency. 
It became a repository for family budget surveys that were an early precursor of poverty studies, 
and in 1935 it set up a Yearbook of Labour Statistics, helping to define labour concepts as a 
dominant way of looking at what counts as work and what does not. Through its official journal, 
the International Labour Review, the ILO was also one avenue for debate around the ideas of 
Keynes and those working in a similar vein. 
 
The period cemented a labourist and sectoral way of looking at the world of work and economic 
activity. The key point was that the Great Transformation taking place was about shaping and 
regulating national markets. In that respect, the ILO was a way of taking labour out of 
international trade, steering countries to raise non-wage labour costs in the form of social 
protection and limits on exploitation rather than compete by undercutting such costs. As Polanyi 
(1944/1957: 27-28) put it, the ILO was set up ‘to equalise conditions of competition among the 
nations so that trade might be liberated without danger to standards of living.’ However, this was 
predicated on a model of industrial employment, consisting predominantly of men in full-time 
wage labour, and a static international division of labour, in which the ‘colonies’ and ‘primitive 
economies’ produced and exported primary goods, such as food and minerals, while the 
‘advanced’ countries traded industrial goods between themselves.  
 
A feature of this phase was the equivocal position of the USA. It was an influence, hosting 
various ILO meetings. But it only joined in 1934. From the outset, successive US administrations 
felt disinclined to ratify ILO Conventions, even though they urged other countries to do so. This 
awkward position was to continue into the twenty-first century. 
                 
B. The industrial citizenship era: 1944-69 
 
Historically, 1944 was pivotal for the ILO. In that year, three documents were published that 
were to shape its future. Polanyi’s Great Transformation provided a framework for 
understanding how societies could recover from the horrors that stemmed from financial market 
hubris and the Great Crash of 1929. He depicted a ‘double movement’ by which the state re-
embedded the economy in society through systems of regulation, redistribution and social 
protection. The ILO was ready to assist in this particular Transformation, since it was geared to 
national industrial labour markets.  
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The Organisation took up one of Polanyi’s themes in its Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which 
was endorsed by a meeting of government ministers, union leaders and employer representatives 
from countries on the winning side of the Second World War. Committing the ILO to tripartite 
collective bargaining, it included a defining one-line paragraph, ‘Labour is not a commodity.’ 
 
Meanwhile, a third document was to ignite an intellectual fire that led to a counter-attack on the 
ILO three decades later, as globalisation took off amid a new phase of domination by financial 
capitalism. This was Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944), which inspired a generation 
of libertarian thinkers opposed to social democracy, Keynesianism and the variants of 
‘collectivism’ and ‘welfare state’ that predominated in the post-1945 decades. 
 
In 1946 the ILO became the first specialised agency of the newly formed United Nations. 
Standard setting accelerated. The ILO established no fewer than 43 Conventions between 1946 
and 1951, nearly three times as many per year as in its first twenty years. The aim of spreading 
these national standards to developing countries was coupled with a determination to reduce the 
commodity character of labour. But, in tune with the emerging welfare states and the Leninist 
model in the Soviet bloc, the ILO inadvertently ushered in an era of ‘fictitious 
decommodification’. The money wage shrank as a share of employee remuneration while state 
and enterprise benefits grew, making employees (and their families) more dependent on wage 
labour for their economic security.
1
 Essentially, the ILO became a mechanism for advancing an 
agenda of labour-based security, overwhelmingly for those in what was to be called the Standard 
Employment Relationship, in full-time, stable, unionised wage jobs. 
 
As for redistribution, the ILO put its faith in sectoral or centralised collective bargaining and the 
impact of a high level of employment in strengthening the bargaining position of employees. 
Like others at the time, it presumed that ‘Full Employment’ could be maintained and that it 
would induce a reduction in inequality. The notion of Full Employment was a misnomer; the 
labour statistics and social policies of the era largely focused on ‘male breadwinners’, treating 
women as secondary workers expected to drop conveniently out of the labour market in 
recessions. 
 
The labourist model took shape through standard setting.
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 The defining Conventions were those 
espousing freedom of association for employees and employers (C87 of 1948) and freedom of 
those groups to bargain collectively (C98 of 1949), several on discrimination, notably C111 of 
1958, which focused exclusively on horizontal redistribution, or equity, notably on gender 
equality of treatment, and the Social Security Convention No.102 of 1952. There was nothing on 
vertical redistribution, that is, the reduction of income or wealth inequality. 
 
Convention No.102 was particularly significant since it espoused a particular model of social 
security, in which nine contingency risks were identified as deserving compensatory state 
benefits. It is the way in which the Convention was written that is so revealing. It was thoroughly 
labourist – all benefits being linked to the performance of labour – and thoroughly sexist, 
referring to male breadwinners and dependent wives. Remarkably, that Convention was declared 
by the International Labour Conference in 2001 to be one of 71 ‘up-do-date’ Conventions. 
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Finally, the labourist model crystallised in the Employment Policy Convention No.122 of 1964, 
which committed ratifying countries to maintaining ‘full, productive and freely chosen 
employment’, including ‘freedom of choice of employment’. In this, the ILO over-reached itself, 
reflecting the Keynesian smugness of the time and ignoring the sexist notion of Full 
Employment. It was never able to hold countries to this Convention. One problem was that it did 
not deal with trade-offs. For instance, should ‘full’ be given greater weight than ‘free’?  
 
Nevertheless, it was largely as a result of its impressive edifice of Conventions and 
Recommendations that the ILO received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969, its fiftieth anniversary. It 
happened to be the year that could be described as the zenith of the model of labourism that the 
ILO had helped to shape. Things were about to go badly wrong. 
 
There had been earlier signs that the model was in trouble. For instance, the Japanese 
government had been upset by criticism of its policy on freedom of association by an ILO 
Committee of Enquiry. Japan was then forging an alternative system that was challenging the 
international division of labour, gaining distinct trading advantages. The ‘NICs’ (newly 
industrialising countries) were beginning to emerge. 
 
Partly reflecting concern that its traditional standard-setting role was under strain, the ILO 
embarked on what was to become a feature of all international agencies, technical co-operation – 
providing assistance and advice on policy and institution building. This opened up a source of 
internal tension: decisions had to be made on the relative allocation of funds and expertise to 
standard setting and technical assistance. To some extent, the tension was postponed, since in 
those early days there were governments and funding organisations prepared to support technical 
assistance. But henceforth the ILO was to rely increasingly on ‘soft money’ from donors for 
specific projects or causes. 
 
The dynamics matter. The regular budget process provides scope for setting and adhering to an 
institutional direction and forging a strategy to pursue it. With soft money, the payers call the 
tune. Internally, reliance on soft money induces conflicting behaviour and attitudes, with staff 
pressured to tailor their statements and actions so as not to offend donors or potential donors. 
These conflicts were to enfeeble the ILO’s response to the coming ideological onslaught. 
                   
C. Labourism disembedded: 1970-98 
 
Immediately after the Nobel accolade, David Morse, the long-serving American ILO Director-
General, launched a grandiose concept, the World Employment Programme (WEP), and then 
promptly retired. This new structure obviously suggested to outsiders that the ILO was setting 
itself up as a mechanism to promote employment all over the world. But, even though the Pope 
and many political leaders participated in its launch, the reality was that there was no money to 
do anything grandiose. 
 
So, the WEP had to raise soft money and build a research base. A new generation of 
academically qualified economists and sociologists came in on short-term precarious contracts. 
Considerable energy and dynamism were generated. But the activities contributed to the 
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structural tensions, between what were now three pillars of the organisation – standard setting, 
technical assistance and ‘knowledge development’. The tension was aggravated by the WEP’s 
‘subversive’ agenda. Instead of concentrating on employment as the objective, it shifted focus to 
poverty reduction, which crystallised in two pioneering development concepts – ‘basic needs’ 
and ‘the informal sector’. The shift took the ILO into uncharted territory, while challenging some 
of the basic tenets of the labourist model. It was a gift to external critics.          
 
 Those critics were gathering strength. Dramatically, and compounding the ILO’s financial 
problems, in 1970 the USA suspended its contributions to the regular budget, having already 
allowed substantial arrears in payment of its dues to build up. Since the USA contributed about a 
quarter of the primary budget, the effect was sharp. Worse was to come. In November 1975, 
Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, sent a letter to the ILO Director-General giving the 
mandatory two-year notice of intention to withdraw. The reasons given are reviewed elsewhere 
(Standing 2008).  
 
Two points are relevant to our later discussion. First, the letter was drafted by John Dunlop, then 
the doyen of American industrial relations, with strong backing by the AFL-CIO (the US trade 
union body). Second, the US position reflected the ideological shift taking place in the USA, and 
the ascendancy of Hayek’s disciples in and around Chicago, in what became known as the 
Chicago School of law and economics. Its adherents regarded most of what the ILO promoted as 
anathema and the source of the rising ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s. 
 
Tension reached a peak over events in Chile following the Pinochet coup, which included the 
assassination of many trade unionists. Kissinger and prominent Chicago economists backed the 
Pinochet regime. The ILO was constitutionally bound to investigate complaints that Conventions 
ratified by previous Chilean governments were being viciously abused. Little could be done. But 
tempers were frayed. 
 
Eventually, the USA did withdraw. It did not return until 1980, by which time the ILO leadership 
was prepared to go along, uneasily, with the emerging hegemonic doctrine, to be known soon 
after as the Washington Consensus. By then, most of the WEP had been wound up; ‘basic needs’ 
was a fading memory, and the knowledge-gathering agency role was beginning to blur into safer 
support for technical assistance projects or into underfunded fringe research. 
 
The period that followed was dominated not just by the agenda set by the Washington 
Consensus, which repudiated several of the crucial elements of the ILO model, but also by the 
steady encroachment of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund into spheres hitherto 
regarded as the domain of the ILO, notably through the structural adjustment programmes that 
were coming into vogue.
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The ILO was faced with an existential challenge. Should it stand up robustly for its old 
regulatory model and contest the claims and ‘mission creep’ of the international financial 
agencies, and the neo-liberal model in general? Should it acquiesce? Or should it set out to forge 
a new model? It could not make up its mind, although it made occasional gestures in all three 
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directions that earned little respect. Expedience became the rule. But in reality, the ILO was 
losing its historic role of setting the parameters of national labour markets. 
 
One factor in its shrinking capacity was the growing reliance on soft money. For instance, when 
the collapse of the Soviet system briefly gave the ILO renewed legitimacy, technical departments 
were torn between criticising the neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ policies being promoted by US 
academics and the international financial agencies, and seeking World Bank funds. The 
contradiction came to a head over the Bank’s campaign to reform pension schemes around the 
world in favour of individual private schemes. The ILO’s senior officials in the Social Security 
Department were hostile to what the Bank was doing, but needed Bank funds for projects. One 
could give numerous other examples. The effect was a weary focus on survival.  
 
As the knowledge-agency function shrivelled, the technical assistance work was increasingly 
imbalanced, with growing emphasis on what external funders wanted, or were thought to want. 
From being marginal to the mainstream of the ILO, child labour became easily the biggest 
programme. This was ‘low-hanging fruit’, since nobody could oppose the abolition of abusive 
forms of child labour. But too much money was allocated, which vastly exceeded the 
Organisation’s capacity to spend efficiently. 
 
With research in the doldrums and technical assistance losing direction, the third strand of the 
ILO was about to undergo a metamorphosis. Standard setting in the 1990s reflected the strains of 
defending the labourist model as globalisation strengthened and as other international agencies - 
most notably the IMF, World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) - advanced the neo-liberal model. The march of labour market flexibility 
was at full strength. In developing countries, the old presumption of a steady transfer of people 
labouring informally into formal employment was clearly going into reverse. In addition, almost 
everywhere, there was a shift to more precarious and indirect forms of labour, unreached by ILO 
Conventions. Privatisation of social and labour market policy was making matters more 
complicated. 
 
The ILO tried to respond by talking about ‘extending’ social security to groups outside the 
standard employment relationship, and it dabbled with ideas of two-tier regulation, with lighter-
touch protection for the so-called informal sector. It established a Private Employment Agency 
Convention (C181 of 1997), repudiating its long-held opposition to privatisation enshrined in 
Conventions No.88 of 1948 and No.96 of 1949. It passed a Homework Convention (C177 of 
1996) to try to reach outworkers that was remarkable for its brevity and for the fact that it dealt 
only with wage workers doing homework. This was greeted with disdain by member countries, 
only five ratifying it, none of them major. 
 
Meanwhile, the ILO was busy ‘withdrawing’ many of its older Conventions, 20 in its Conference 
of 2002 and 16 in 2004, for instance. But most symbolic of the end of the ‘forward march of 
labour’ conventions, a protracted attempt to produce a Convention on Contract Labour failed in 
the face of opposition from the Employers on the Governing Body and the tortuous attempts in 
successive drafts to define what was being covered. This epitomised the disarray of the labourist 
model in a world of rapidly evolving work patterns. Ironically, shortly after this unprecedented 
7 
 
rebuff, the most senior ILO official dealing with Conventions declared victory, saying that the 
body of international labour standards had been completed (Swepston 2005: 11). 
 
Seeing labour standards in difficulty, Michel Hansenne, a Belgian Christian Democrat politician 
who was ILO Director-General in the 1990s, developed a self-prescribed mission to preserve 
them in more voluntaristic mode. He crafted a Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, which after long negotiations was adopted in 1998. It was hailed as a triumph, and 
welcomed effusively by the US administration, the AFL-CIO and the international trades unions. 
Since then, it has attracted an infusion of financial resources. But it was a pyrrhic victory. 
 
The Declaration represented a major retreat from the standard-setting agenda of the previous 80 
years. It stipulated that henceforth all member countries had to subscribe to the Declaration, 
which enshrined eight Conventions as ‘fundamental’. The commitment was declamatory in 
character; countries could say they were committed to the principles, and could choose to call on 
the ILO to help realise them. This was far from the original idea of Conventions as legally 
binding and subject to critical investigation. Moreover, the Declaration implicitly rejected a 
fundamental principle established in 1948 in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
that all rights are indivisible and interdependent. Here was the ILO establishing a core, 
ostentatiously turning the other 180 Conventions into low-priority matters. And scarcely noticed 
was the fact that all the eight core Conventions related to civil and common law; they were 
‘negative’ rights, not substantive progressive rights that could be used to forge a new model of 
work and social policy. Finally, in place of a legally binding ‘social clause’ in the World Trade 
Organisation, for which there had been pressure, the Declaration sidelined the issues, since trade 
and other sanctions were ruled out for breaches of the commitments. Soft law was replacing 
binding law.  
 
Just as the defeat of the Contract Labour Convention was the end of the road for employment 
regulation, so the Declaration was the end of the road for the labourist model. It symbolised the 
zenith of the triumph of the neo-liberal model. 
 
D. The populist era: 1999-2009           
 
Juan Somavia, a former Chilean diplomat, succeeded Michel Hansenne in 1999 determined to 
make the ILO a more visible participant on the international stage. To help, he brought in a 
stream of outsiders with no previous experience of the ILO or record of work relating to it. 
 
Among the most symbolic changes, he abolished the Industrial Relations Department, a sphere 
that almost defined the essence of the social democratic labourist model. In its place, he set up a 
Social Dialogue Sector, headed by an ex-staffer from Bill Clinton’s White House. The term 
‘social dialogue’ had been developed in the OECD, partly to indicate distance from models of 
adversarial collective bargaining and labour law constructed through the twentieth century. 
Social dialogue was utterly vague, with no sense of bargaining and no implication for 
redistribution. The death of industrial relations melded perfectly with the Third Wayism of the 
political community that the new Director-General wished to join, in which inequality was 
regarded as unimportant. 
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The essence of modern populism is to leave structures intact while developing a rhetoric that is 
non-threatening to powerful interests while seeming to be on the side of the poor, vulnerable and 
disadvantaged. This was embodied by what was to become the mantra of the new ILO – ‘decent 
work’ (ILO 1999). Said to combine rights with opportunities, the formula was rich in potential, 
but soon turned into a stream of platitudes. A platitude is a statement to which one could not 
imagine any rational person disagreeing. Subsequent attempts to define and measure decent work 
in terms of actual policies and practices, at the level of firms and at the level of government 
policy, were condemned and suppressed, at the behest of both Employers and Workers on the 
Governing Body. 
 
The term ‘decent work’ fed into all ILO reports, and millions of dollars were devoted to its 
promotion as a slogan around the world.
4
 In its timidity to define and measure what was meant, 
the first casualty was ‘work’; it soon became apparent that the labourist model was sufficiently 
alive to transform the meaning to ‘decent jobs’, whatever ‘decent’ meant. Care work, and 
voluntary and community work, all remained invisible and neglected, even though these are done 
by more people for more time than any other form of work. 
 
The personalised commitment to decent work marked a costly diversion from the need to forge a 
renewed role for the ILO in responding to the changing world of work in the twenty-first century 
and the second phase of the Global Transformation. The malaise has gone deep inside the 
organisation. Staffing policy has been increasingly politicised, and its capacity for independent 
research has been compromised. Vast funds have been devoted to glossy reports that are not 
subject to independent peer review. Standard-setting work has fallen into a state of disrepair. In 
these circumstances, could the ILO be revived? What sort of international body is needed? 
 
Restructuring the global regulator 
 
There is one reason for being pessimistic, or realistic, about the chances of reviving the ILO. It is 
stuck in an antiquated governance structure that was once relatively ‘democratic’ but has become 
woefully unrepresentative and atavistic in its orientation. The 182-country Organisation is ruled 
by a Director-General, elected by the Governing Body for a renewable five-year term, and a 52-
strong ‘tripartite’ Governing Body made up of 28 government representatives (10 countries with 
permanent seats, the others revolving), 14 representatives of Workers (trades unions) and 14 
representatives of Employers (members of the International Organisation of Employers). Neither 
Workers nor Employers are representative of the interests their names would suggest. A tiny 
fraction of people who work belong to trades unions. And it is doubtful whether many employers 
know anything about the IOE.  
 
Both of these blocs could make the counter-claim that they are more representative than any 
other possible body, although Chambers of Commerce might beg to disagree on the employers’ 
side and occupational bodies could do so on the workers’ side. But the more worrying problem is 
that the blocs represent the two sides of just one way of looking at work and labour, two sides of 
one type of relationship that prevailed for less than 100 years of two millennia. They are stuck in 
the middle decades of the twentieth century, and have been clinging to the wreckage of the 
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labourist model. It is hardly likely they would willingly surrender their position on the podium of 
the one international body that has allowed them to play their parts on the world stage. 
 
The Workers in particular probably only survive because of the financial and other support 
gained from the ILO, making the relationship inherently subject to moral and immoral hazards. 
Favoured officials seamlessly slip into senior positions in the ILO, with some going back to 
senior positions in the International Trade Union Confederation. This is institutionally unhealthy. 
 
Imagining a revival of the Organisation in the face of the governance structure is to allow hope 
to triumph over experience. The turkeys will not vote for Christmas. The problem is 
compounded by the fact that within the Office, the Director General can act without due process 
on key matters, including the appointment and transfer or dismissal of senior officials. When 
Kofi Annan was UN Secretary General, there was an unwritten rule that nobody could be a head 
of a UN body for more than two terms. But the current ILO Director General managed to be re-
elected for a third term in November 2008, with leading governments abstaining. There were 
murmurs of discontent, and a loose agreement has been reached that in the future nobody should 
have more than two terms. There is surely an argument for saying that in a global body, with so 
many people and countries from which to choose senior officials, nobody should have more than 
one term of, say, five years. There should also be a rigid rule that nobody on or connected with 
the Governing Body should be employed by the ILO within, say, three years of being on it. The 
system as it stands is too open to potential abuse. 
Reform of the governance structure is probably a prerequisite before much progress could be 
made towards altering the character and level of the ILO’s performance. However, it is possible 
to sketch an agenda that the ILO, or another body dealing with global labour and work issues, 
could develop over the next decade. 
 
We should begin by recalling the context. The financial crisis of 2008-09 was the crisis of the 
Global Transformation, just as the crisis of 1929-32 was the collapse of a period of financial 
market domination that eventually led to the embedded phase of Polanyi’s Great Transformation. 
The world’s citizens and interest groups will want to see emerging from the first global recession 
new systems of regulation, redistribution and social protection more attuned to an open global 
market economy. This may take years to take shape, and could even usher in a period of political 
extremism before a new model is established. But whereas the Great Transformation led to 
decades of industrial citizenship, based on labour-related social ‘rights’ (or entitlements), the 
Global Transformation may lead to a period of occupational citizenship, in which rights and 
work practices are built around the pursuit of an occupational existence (Standing 2009). 
 
For most of its existence since 1919, the ILO has concentrated on labour and industrial relations 
around collective bargaining. It has treated occupational issues and work issues outside labour as 
irrelevant or marginal. But reality has swept on. Care work, the work done by more people than 
any other, is not the subject of any ILO Convention. More people are covered by occupational 
licensing in the USA than are members of trades unions. Bodies representing the world’s great 
professions are not involved in the ILO at all. The ILO has completely ignored the sphere of 
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occupational regulation. The governance structure has blocked any move in that direction, 
making sure that no organisation representing any profession is a member of the Governing 
Body or given a status at the annual International Labour Conference, which is attended by over 
3,000 people each June. 
 
The Employers’ and Workers’ blocs have avoided forms of bargaining around work that do not 
fit the labourist model of collective bargaining. And their interpretation of freedom of association 
has been narrow. What rules, for instance, should apply to associations of ‘independent 
contractors’ if they seek to bargain with potential employers or the government? Under standard 
competition rules, they would run up against anti-trust provisions, whereas under ILO-inspired 
labour law, employees are given special status by virtue of their dependency and the presumption 
that they are weaker than the representatives of capital.  
 
The globalising labour process needs an international body that can forge a framework for 
occupational regulation and for what I have called ‘collaborative bargaining’. Some of the most 
sensitive work issues take place between occupations, for example, between doctors and nurses 
and auxiliaries. There may be oppression, suppression or contrived splintering of occupations by 
dominant groups, sometimes aided by the state. International bodies of professions are taking 
shape. But they are doing so haphazardly, with little accountability or transparent rules. What is 
happening in the occupational sphere has profound implications for reinterpreting such hallowed 
ideas as ‘the right to work’ or, as libertarians put it, ‘the right to practise’. 
 
A renewed ILO, or an International Work Rights Organisation, would have to confront some of 
the most threatening undercurrents of labour and social policy, which the current leadership has 
conspicuously avoided. For instance, there is the global drift to forms of ‘workfare’ that make 
entitlement to state benefits conditional not only on means tests but on increasingly coercive 
behaviour tests. Many governments now require the unemployed to take jobs determined for 
them if they want to receive any ‘insurance’ benefits or any benefits at all. But workfare is 
strikingly at odds with Convention No.122 of 1964, which claims employment should be ‘freely 
chosen’.5 
 
Rules are also needed to regulate the growing use of labour subsidies, particularly as many are a 
form of subsidy protectionism. To some extent, they may be taken up, reluctantly, by the World 
Trade Organisation but its jurisdiction in this area is limited. 
 
Then there are the increasingly ominous matters surrounding surveillance and ‘dataveillance’, 
the incursion of employers and others into realms of privacy (on these issues, see Clarke 2006). 
Information technology and a rhetoric of ‘security’ are being used to discriminate and penalise in 
ways that threaten liberty in and around work. The world needs an organisation that fights 
resolutely to curb the global trend.  
 
Above all, the world needs a body that can set rules of decency for all forms of work and for 
labour mobility, including international migration. Here the ILO has been pusillanimous; as of 
early 2009, it had just five professionals dealing with migration, out of some 2,500 officials. 
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The ILO’s future should be re-evaluated as part of the restructuring of the international 
regulatory architecture in the aftermath of the financial crisis. All three aspects of its work – 
standard setting, technical assistance and knowledge gathering – are in disrepair and many of its 
pronouncements lack substance, leaving it open to criticism from all political directions.
6
 The 
UN should set up an independent commission of experts to propose a way forward. The world of 
work requires it. 
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1
 For an elaboration of this argument, see Standing (2007).  
2
 For the full texts of all Conventions and Recommendations, see ILO (1996 et seq.). The ILO produces an annual 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. 
3
 For those involved in the efforts to resist the liberalisation agenda of the international financial agencies, it was a 
source of bitter irony that, in 2009, in response to the nemesis of the model they had done so much to promote, the 
G20 leaders gave them vastly more resources to make them more powerful. One of the policies they had spread 
around the world was pension privatisation, with disastrous effects. In the 1990s, the Bank took over responsibility 
for pension reform, without the mandate or expertise, while the ILO, previously the agency dealing with social 
security, was marginalised.  
4
 The most conspicuous example was the multi-million dollar exercise that led to a Fair Globalisation report, 
ostensibly written by a ‘World Commission’ of prominent individuals (World Commission on the Social Dimension 
of Globalisation 2004).  
5
 While writing this article, an ILO document came to hand that advocated workfare (ILO 2009: 32). There is no 
ILO Convention that could justify that. It also reiterated legitimacy for Convention 102 on social security (ILO 
2009: 36).    
6
 For a critique from the right, coming from a former senior official of the US Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
International Affairs (and representative to the ILO), see Ponticelli (2009).  
